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From First-Order Logic to Assertional Logic
Yi Zhou
Abstract
First-Order Logic (FOL) is widely regarded as one of the most important foun-
dations for knowledge representation. Nevertheless, in this paper, we argue that
FOL has several critical issues for this purpose. Instead, we propose an alterna-
tive called assertional logic, in which all syntactic objects are categorized as set
theoretic constructs including individuals, concepts and operators, and all kinds of
knowledge are formalized by equality assertions. We first present a primitive form
of assertional logic that uses minimal assumed knowledge and constructs. Then,
we show how to extend it by definitions, which are special kinds of knowledge,
i.e., assertions. We argue that assertional logic, although simpler, is more expres-
sive and extensible than FOL. As a case study, we show how assertional logic can
be used to unify logic and probability, and more building blocks in AI.
1 Introduction
Classical First-Order Logic (FOL) is widely regarded as one of the most important
foundations of symbolic AI. FOL plays a central role in the field of Knowledge Rep-
resentation and Reasoning (KR). Many of its fragments (such as propositional logic,
modal and epistemic logic, description logics), extensions (such as second-order logic,
situation calculus and first-order probabilistic logic) and variants (such as Datalog and
first-order answer set programming) have been extensively studied in the literature
[6, 22].
Nevertheless, AI researchers have pointed out several issues regarding using FOL
for knowledge representation and reasoning, mostly from the reasoning point of view.
First, FOL is computationally very difficult. Reasoning about FOL is a well-known
undecidable problem. Also, FOL is monotonic in the sense that adding new knowl-
edge into a first-order knowledge base always results in more consequences. However,
human reasoning is sometimes nonmonotonic.
In this paper, we argue that FOL also has some critical issues from the knowledge
representation point of view. First of all, although FOL is considered natural for well-
trained logicians, it is not simple and flexible enough for knowledge engineers with
less training. One reason is the distinction and hierarchy between term level, predicate
level and formula level. From my own experience as a teacher in this subject, although
strongly emphasized in the classes, many students failed to understand why a predicate
or a formula cannot be in the scope of a function. Another reason is the notion of free
occurrences of variables. For instance, it is not easily understandable for many students
why the GEN inference rule has to enforce the variable occurrence restrictions. Last
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but not least, arbitrary nesting also raises issues. Although natural from a mathematical
point of view, a nested formula, e.g., (x∨¬(y∧z))∧(¬y∨¬x) is hard to be understood
and used.
Secondly, FOL has limitations in terms of expressive power. FOL cannot quantify
over predicates/functions. This can be addressed by extending FOL into high-order
logic. Nevertheless, high-order logic still cannot quantify over formulas. As a conse-
quence, FOL and high-order logic are not able to represent an axiom or an inference
rule in logic, such as Modus Ponens. Flexible quantification beyond the term level is
needed in applications. As an example, in automated solving mathematical problems,
we often use proof by induction. To represent this, we need to state that for some state-
ment P with a number parameter, if that P holds for all numbers less than k implies
that P holds for the number k as well, then P holds for all natural numbers. Here, P
is a statement at a formula level, possibly with complex sub-statements within itself.
Hence, in order to represent and use proof by induction, we need to quantify over P
that is at a formula level.
Thirdly, FOL is hard to be extended with new building blocks. FOL itself cannot
formalize some important AI notions including probability, actions, time etc., which
are needed in a wide range of applications. For this purpose, AI researchers have
made significant progresses on extending FOL with these notions separately, such as
first-order probabilistic logic [4, 12], situation calculus [15, 16], CTL [7] etc. Each is
a challenging task in the sense that it has to completely re-define the syntax as well
as the semantics. However, combing these notions together, even several of them,
seems an extremely difficult task. Moreover, there are many more building blocks to
be incorporated in applications. For instance, consider task planning for home service
robots [13]. It is necessary to represent actions, probability, time and more building
blocks such as preferences altogether at the same time.
To address these issues, we propose assertional logic, in which all syntactic objects
are categorized as set theoretic constructs including individuals, concepts and opera-
tors, and all kinds of knowledge are uniformly formalized by equality assertions of
the form a = b, where a and b are either atomic individuals or compound individuals.
Semantically, individuals, concepts and operators are interpreted as elements, sets and
functions respectively in set theory, and knowledge of the form a = b means that the
two individuals a and b are referring to the same element.
We first present the primitive form of assertional logic that uses minimal assumed
knowledge and primitive constructs. Then, we show how to extend it with more build-
ing blocks by definitions, which are special kinds of knowledge, i.e., assertions used
to define new individuals, concepts and operators. Once these new syntactic objects
are defined, they can be used as a basis to define more. As an example, we show how
to define multi-assertions by using Cartesian product, and nested assertions by using
multi-assertions.
We show that assertional logic, although simpler, is more expressive and extensible
than FOL. As a case study, we show how to extend assertional logic for unifying logic
and probability, and more important AI building blocks including time. Note that our
intention is not to reinvent the wheel of these building blocks but to borrow existing
excellent work on formalizing these building blocks separately and to assemble them
within one framework (i.e., assertional logic) so that they can live happily ever after.
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2 Meta Language and Prior Knowledge
One cannot build something from nothing. Hence, in order to establish assertional
logic, we need some basic knowledge. Of course, for the purpose of explanation, we
need an informal meta language whose syntax and semantics are pre-assumed. As
usual, we use a natural language such as English. Nevertheless, this meta language is
used merely for explanation and it should not affect the syntax as well as the semantics
of anything defined formally.
Only a meta level explanation language is not enough. Other than this, we also need
some core objects and knowledge, whose syntax and semantics are pre-assumed as
well. These are called prior objects and prior knowledge. For instance, when defining
real numbers, we need some prior knowledge about natural numbers; when defining
probability, we need some prior knowledge about real numbers.
In assertional logic, we always treat the equality symbol “=” as a prior object.
There are some prior knowledge associated with the equality symbol. For instance, “=”
is an equivalence relation satisfying reflexivity, symmetricity, and transitivity. Also,
“=” satisfies the general substitution property, that is, if a = b, then a can be used
to replace b anywhere. Other than the equality symbol, we also assume some prior
objects and their associated prior knowledge in set theory [11], including set operators
such as set union and Cartesian product, Boolean values, set builder notations and
natural numbers.
3 Assertional Logic: the Primitive Form
In this section, we present the primitive form of assertional logic. As the goal of asser-
tional logic is to syntactically represent knowledge in application domains, there are
two essential tasks, i.e., how to capture the syntax of the domain and how to represent
knowledge in it.
3.1 Capturing the syntax
Given an application domain, a syntactic structure (structure for short if clear from
the context) of the domain is a triple 〈I, C,O〉, where I is a collection of individuals,
representing objects in the domain, C a collection of concepts, representing groups
of objects sharing something in common andO a collection of operators, representing
relationships and connections among individuals and concepts. Concepts and operators
can be nested and considered as individuals as well. If needed, we can have concepts
of concepts, concepts of operators, concepts of concepts of operators and so on.
An operator could be multi-ary, that is, it maps a tuple of individuals into a single
one. Each multi-ary operator O is associated with a domain of the form (C1, . . . , Cn),
representing all possible values that the operator O can operate on, where Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤
n, is a concept. We call n the arity ofO. For a tuple (a1, . . . , an) matching the domain
of an operator O, i.e., ai ∈ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, O maps (a1, . . . , an) into an individual,
denoted by O(a1, . . . , an).
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Operators are similar to functions in FOL but differs in two essential ways. First,
operators are many-sorted as C1, . . . , Cn could be different concepts. More impor-
tantly, C1, . . . , Cn could be high-order constructs, e.g., concepts of concepts, concepts
of operators.
3.2 Representing knowledge
Let 〈I, C,O〉 be a syntactic structure. A term is an individual, either an atomic individ-
ual a ∈ I or the result O(a1, . . . , an) of an operator O operating on some individuals
a1, . . . , an. We also call the latter compound individuals.
An assertion is of the form
a = b, (1)
where a and b are two terms. Intuitively, an assertion of the form (1) is a piece of
knowledge in the application domain, claiming that the left and the right side refer to
the same object. A knowledge base is a set of assertions. Terms and assertions can be
considered as individuals as well.
Similar to concepts that group individuals, we use schemas to group terms and as-
sertions. A schema term is either an atomic conceptC ∈ C or of the formO(C1, . . . , Cn),
where Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are concepts. Essentially, a schema term represents a set of
terms, in which every concept is grounded by a corresponding individual. That is,
O(C1, . . . , Cn) is the collection {O(a1, . . . , an)}, where ai ∈ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are in-
dividuals. Then, a schema assertion is of the same form as form (1) except that terms
can be replaced by schema terms. Similarly, a schema assertion represents a set of
assertions.
We say that a schema term/assertion mentions a set {C1, . . . , Cn} of concepts if
C1, . . . , Cn occur in it, and only mentions if {C1, . . . , Cn} contains all concepts men-
tioned in it. Note that it could be the case that two or more different individuals are
referring to the same concept C in schema terms and assertions. In this case, we need
to use different copies of C, denoted by C1, C2, . . . , to distinguish them. For instance,
all assertions x = y, where x and y are human, are captured by the schema assertion
Human1 = Human2. On the other side, in a schema, the same copy of a concept C
can only refer to the same individual. For instance, Human = Human is the set of
all assertions of the form x = x, where x ∈ Human.
3.3 The semantics
We propose a set theoretic semantics for assertional logic. Since we assume set theory
as the prior knowledge, in the semantics, we freely use those individuals (e.g., the
empty set), concepts (e.g., the set of all natural numbers) and operators (e.g., the set
union operator) without explanation.
An interpretation (also called a possible world) is a pair 〈∆, .I〉, where ∆ is a
domain of elements, and .I is a mapping function that admits all prior knowledge, and
maps each individual into a domain element in∆, each concept into a set in∆ and each
n-ary operator into an n-ary function in∆. The mapping function .I is generalized for
4
terms by mapping O(a1, . . . , an) to O
I(aI
1
, . . . , aIn). Similar to terms and assertions,
interpretations can also be considered as individuals to be studied.
It is important to emphasize that an interpretation has to admit all prior knowledge.
For instance, since we assume set theory, suppose that an interpretation maps two in-
dividuals x and y as the same element a in the domain, then the concepts {x} and {y}
must be interpreted as {a}, and x = y must be interpreted as a = a.
Let I be an interpretation and a = b an assertion. We say that I is a model of
a = b, denoted by I |= a = b iff .I(a) = .I(b), also written aI = bI . Let KB be a
knowledge base. We say that I is a model ofKB, denoted by I |= KB, iff I is a model
of all assertions in KB. We say that an assertion A is a property of KB, denoted by
KB |= A, iff all models of KB are also models of A. In particular, we say that an
assertion A is a tautology iff it is modeled by all interpretations.
Since we assume set theory as our prior knowledge, we directly borrow some set
theoretic constructs. For instance, we can use ∪(C1, C2) (also written as C1 ∪ C2) to
denote a new concept that unions two conceptsC1 andC2. Applying this to assertions,
we can see that assertions of the primitive form (1) can indeed represent many im-
portant features in knowledge representation. For instance, the membership assertion,
stating that an individual a is an instance of a concept C, is the following assertion
∈ (a, C) = ⊤ (also written as a ∈ C). The containment assertion, stating that a con-
ceptC1 is contained by another conceptC2, is the following assertion⊆ (C1, C2) = ⊤
(also written as C1 ⊆ C2). The range declaration, stating that the range of an oper-
ator O operating on some concepts C1, . . . , Cn equals to another concept C, is the
following assertion O(C1, . . . , Cn) = C.
4 Extensibility via Definitions
As argued in the introduction section, extensibility is a critical issue for knowledge
representation. In assertional logic, we use definitions for this purpose. Definitions
are (schema) assertions used to define new syntactic objects (including individuals,
concepts and operators) based on existing ones. Once these new syntactic objects are
defined, they can be used to define more. Note that definitions are nothing extra but
special kinds of knowledge (i.e. assertions).
We start with defining new individuals. An individual definition is an assertion of
the form
a = t, (2)
where a is an atomic individual and t is a term. Here, a is the individual to be defined.
This assertion claims that the left side a is defined as the right side t. For instance,
0 = ∅ means that the individual 0 is defined as the empty set.
Defining new operators is similar to defining new individuals except that we use
schema assertions instead. Let O be an operator to be defined and (C1, . . . , Cn) its
domain. An operator definition is a schema assertion of the form
O(C1, . . . , Cn) = T, (3)
where T is a schema term that mentions concepts only from C1, . . . , Cn.
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Since a schema assertion represents a set of assertions, essentially, an operator
definition of the form (3) defines the operatorO by defining the value ofO(a1, . . . , an)
one-by-one, where ai ∈ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For instance, for defining the successor
operator Succ, we can use the schema assertion Succ(N) = {N, {N}}, meaning that,
for every natural number n, the successor of n, is defined as {n, {n}}.
Defining new concepts is somewhat different. As concepts are essentially sets, we
directly borrow set theory notations for this purpose. There are four ways to define a
new concept.
Enumeration Let a1, . . . , an be n individuals. Then, the collection {a1, . . . , an} is a
concept, written as
C = {a1, . . . , an}. (4)
For instance, we can define the conceptDigits byDigits = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.
Operation Let C1 and C2 be two concepts. Then, C1 ∪ C2 (the union of C1 and
C2), C1 ∩ C2 (the intersection of C1 and C2), C1 \ C2 (the difference of C1 and C2),
C1×C2 (the Cartesian product of C1 and C2), 2C1 (the power set of C1) are concepts.
Operation can be written by assertions as well. For instance, the following assertion
C = C1 ∪ C2 (5)
states that the concept C is defined as the union of C1 and C2. As an example, one can
define the conceptMan byMan = Human ∩Male.
Restricted Comprehension LetC be a concept andA(C) a schema assertion that only
mentions concept C. Then, individuals in C satisfying A, denoted by {x ∈ C|A(x)}
(or simply C|A(C)), form a concept, written as
C′ = C|A(C). (6)
For instance, we can define the conceptMale byMale = {Animal |Sex(Animal) =
male}, meaning thatMale consists of all animals whose sexes are male.
Replacement LetO be an operator and C a concept on whichO is well defined. Then,
the individuals mapped from C by O, denoted by {O(x) | x ∈ C} (or simply O(C)),
form a concept, written as
C′ = O(C). (7)
For instance, we can define the conceptParents byParents = ParentOf(Human),
meaning that it consists of all individuals who is a ParentOf some human.
Definitions can be incremental. We may define some syntactic objects first. Once
defined, they can be used to define more. One can always continue with this incremen-
tal process. For instance, in arithmetic, we define the successor operator first. Once
defined, it can be used to define the add operator, which is further served as a basis to
define more.
Since terms and assertions can be considered as individuals, we can define new type
of terms and assertions by definitions. As an example, we extend assertions of the form
(1) into multi-assertions by using Cartesian product. We first define multi-assertions of
a fixed number of assertions. Given a number n, we define a new operator Mn with
arity n by the following schema assertion:
Mn(C1 = D1, . . . , Cn = Dn) = (C1, . . . , Cn) = (D1, . . . , Dn),
6
where Ci, Di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are concepts of terms. Notice that, (C1, . . . , Cn) =
(D1, . . . , Dn) is a single assertion of the form (1). In this sense, an n-ary multi-
assertion is just a syntax sugar. Then, we define the concept of multi-assertions:
Multi−Assertion =
⋃
1≤i≤∞
Mi(A
1, . . . ,Ai),
whereA1, . . . ,Ai are i copies of standard assertions. For convenience,we useAssertion1, . . . , Assertionn
to denote an n-ary multi-assertion. Once multi-assertion is defined, it can be used to
define more syntactic objects.
As an example, we use multi-assertion to define nested assertions. We first define
nested terms as follows:
Nested− Term = Term ∪N − Term
N − Term = Op(Nested− Term).
Then, nested assertions can be defined as
Nested−Assertion = Nested− Term = Nested− Term.
Again, once nested assertion is defined, it can be used as basis to define more, so
on and so forth. Using nested assertions can simplify the representation task. However,
one cannot overuse it since, essentially, every use of a nested term introduces a new
individual.
5 Embedding FOL into Assertional Logic
In the previous section, we show how to extend assertions of the primitive form (1)
into multi-assertions and nested assertions. In this section, we continue with this task to
show how to define more complex forms of assertions with logic connectives, including
propositional connectives and quantifiers.
We start with the propositional case. Let A be the concept of nested assertions.
We introduce a number of operators over A in assertional logic, including ¬(A) (for
negation), ∧(A1,A2) (for conjunction), ∨(A1,A2) (for disjunction) and→ (A1,A2)
(for implication).
There could be different ways to define these operators in assertional logic. Let
a = a′ and b = b′ be two (nested) assertions. The propositional connectives are
defined as follows:
¬(a = a′) = {a} ∩ {a′} = ∅
∧(a = a′, b = b′) = ({a} ∩ {a′}) ∪ ({b} ∩ {b′}) = {a, a′, b, b′}
∨(a = a′, b = b′) = ({a} ∩ {a′}) ∪ ({b} ∩ {b′}) 6= ∅
→ (a = a′, b = b′) = ({a, a′} \ {a} ∩ {a′}) ∪ ({b} ∩ {b′}) 6= ∅,
where a 6= a′ is used to also denote ¬(a = a′). One can observe that the ranges of
all logic operators are nested assertions. Hence, similar to multi-assertion and nested
assertion, propositional logic operators are syntactic sugar as well.
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Now we consider to define operators for quantifiers, including ∀ (for the universal
quantifier) and ∃ (for the existential quantifier). The domain of quantifiers is a pair
(C,A(C)), where C is a concept and A(C) is a schema assertion that only mentions
C.
The quantifiers are defines as follows:
∀(C,A(C)) = C|A(C) = C (8)
∃(C,A(C)) = C|A(C) 6= ∅ (9)
Intuitively, ∀(C,A(C)) is true iff those individuals x in C such that A(x) holds equals
to the concept C itself, that is, for all individuals x in C, A(x) holds; ∃(C,A(C)) is
true iff those individuals x in C such that A(x) holds does not equal to the empty set,
that is, there exists at least one individual x in C such that A(x) holds. We can see that
the ranges of quantifiers are nested assertions as well. In this sense, quantifiers are also
syntactic sugar of the primitive form.
Note that quantifiers defined here are ranging from an arbitrary concept C. If C is
a concept of all atomic individuals and all quantifiers range from the same concept C,
then these quantifiers are first-order. Nevertheless, the concepts could be different. In
this case, we have many-sorted FOL. Moreover, C could be complex concepts, e.g., a
concept of all possible concepts. In this case, we have monadic second-order logic. Yet
C could be many more, e.g., a concept of assertions, a concept of concepts of terms
etc. In this sense, the quantifiers become high-order. Finally, the biggest difference
is that C can even be a concept of assertions so that quantifiers in assertional logic
can quantify over assertions (corresponding to formulas in classical logics), while this
cannot be done in classical logics including high-order logic.
It can be verified that all tautologies in propositional logic and FOL (e.g., De-
Morgan’s laws) are also tautologies in assertional logic. For space reasons, we leave
the theorems and their proofs to a full version of this paper.
6 Incorporating Probability and More
Probability is another important building block for knowledge representation. In the
last several decades, with the development of uncertainty in artificial intelligence, a
number of influential approaches [4, 8, 10, 17, 18, 20] have been developed, and im-
portant applications have been found in machine learning, natural language processing
etc.
Normally, to incorporate probability in logic, one has to complete redefine the
whole semantics since the integrations between probability and logic connectives and
quantifiers are complicated. In this section, we show how this can be easily done in
assertional logic. The key point is, although the interactions between logic and prob-
ability are complicated, their interactions with assertions of the basic form (1) is rel-
atively simple. As shown in the previous section, the interactions between logic and
assertions can be defined by a few lines. In this section, following Gaifman’s idea [8],
we show that this is indeed the case for integrating assertions with probability as well.
Then, the interactions between logic and probability will be automatically established
via assertions.
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6.1 Integrating assertions with probability
Since operations over real numbers are involved in defining probability, we need to
assume a theory of real number as our prior knowledge.
Gaifman [8] proposed to define the probability of a logic sentence by the sum of
the probabilities of the possible worlds satisfying it. Following this idea, in assertional
logic, we introduce an operator Pr (for probability) over the concept A of assertions.
The range of Pr is the concept of real numbers. For each possible world w, we assign
an associated weight Ww , which is a positive real number. Then, for an assertion A,
the probability of A, denoted by Pr(A), is define by the following schema assertion:
Pr(A) =
Σw,w|=A Ww
Σw Ww
. (10)
This definition defines the interactions between probability and assertions. In case that
there are a number of infinite worlds, we need to use measure theory. Nevertheless,
this is beyond the scope of our paper.
Once we have defined the probability Pr(A) of an assertionA as a real number, we
can directly use it inside other assertions. In this sense, Pr(A) = 0.5, Pr(A) ≥ 0.3,
Pr(A) ≥ Pr(∀(C,B(C))) − 0.3, Pr(A) × 0.6 ≥ 0.4 and Pr(Pr(A) ≥ 0.3) ≥ 0.3
are all valid assertions. We are able to vefiry some properties about probability, for
instance, Kolmogorov’s first and second probability axioms.
We also extend this definition for conditional probability. We again introduce a
new operator Pr over pairs of two assertions. Following a similar idea, the condi-
tional probability Pr(A1, A2) of an assertion A1 providing another assertion A2, also
denoted by Pr(A1|A2), is defined by the following schema assertion:
Pr(A1|A2) =
Σw,w|=A1,w|=A2 Ww
Σw,w|=A2 Ww
. (11)
Again, once conditional probability is defined as a real number, we can use it ar-
bitrarily inside other assertions. Similarly, we can verify some properties about condi-
tional probabilities, including the famous Bayes’ theorem, i.e.,
Pr(A1)× Pr(A2|A1) = Pr(A2)× Pr(A1|A2).
for all assertions A1 and A2.
6.2 Interactions between logic and probability via assertions
Although we only define probabilities for assertions of the basic form, the interactions
between probability and other building blocks, e.g., logic, are automatically established
since assertions connected by logic operators can be reduced into the primitive form.
In this sense, we can investigate some properties about the interactions between logic
and probability. For instance, it can be observed that Kolmogorov’s third probability
axiom is a tautology in assertion logic. That is, let A1, . . . , An be n assertions that are
pairwise disjoint. Then, Pr(A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An) = Pr(A1) + · · ·+ Pr(An).
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It can be verified that many axioms and properties regarding the interactions be-
tween logic and probability are tautologies in assertional logic, for instance, the addi-
tivity axiom: Pr(φ) = Pr(φ ∧ ψ) + Pr(φ ∧ ¬ψ) and the distributivity axiom: φ ≡ ψ
implies that Pr(φ) = Pr(ψ), for any two assertions φ and ψ. In this sense, assertional
logic can also be used to validate existing properties about the interactions of logic and
probability. In addition, it may foster new discoveries, e.g., the interactions between
higher-order logic and probability and some properties about nested probabilities.
Note that we do not intend to reinvent the wheel of defining probability nor its
interactions with logic. All definitions about (conditional) probability are borrowed
from the literature. Instead, we take probability as a case study to show how one
building block (e.g., logic) and another (e.g., probability) can be interacted through
assertions without going deeper into the interactions between themselves.
6.3 More building blocks
More critically, there are many more important building blocks to be incorporated. It
is barely possible to clarify the interactions among them all. Nevertheless, it becomes
possible to unify them altogether in assertional logic as one only needs to consider the
interactions between these building blocks and the basic form of assertions separately.
Consequently, the interactions among these building blocks themselves will be auto-
matically established via assertions, as what we did for unifying logic and probability.
As another case study, we consider how to formalize time in assertional logic. Time
itself can be understood in different ways such as time points, time interval, LTL and
CTL [1, 7, 19]. Following the same idea of incorporating probability, we only need
to consider the interactions between time and assertions. In this paper, we only report
the simple case of integrating assertions with time points. Let Tp be a concept of time
points. We introduce a new operator t whose domain is a pair (I, T p). Intuitively,
t(i, tp), i ∈ T , tp ∈ Tp, is the value of individual i at time point tp. Then, we intro-
duce temporal formulas, a new Boolean operator T whose domain is a pair (A, T p),
by the following schema assertion:
T (a = b, tp) = t(a, tp) = t(b, tp). (12)
Then, the interactions between time points and logic connectives and probability can
be automatically established. We are able to investigate some properties. For instance,
for all assertions A and B, T (A, tp) = ⊤ iff T (¬A, tp) = ⊥; T (A ∧ B, tp) = ⊤ |=
T (A, tp) = ⊤ etc. Hence, we have an integrated formalism combing logic, probability
and time points in assertional logic.
7 Discussion, Related Work and Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that, for the purpose of knowledge representation, classical first-
order logic has some critical issues, including simplicity, flexibility, expressivity and
extensibility. To address these issues, we propose assertional logic instead, in which the
syntax of an application domain is captured by individuals (i.e., objects in the domain),
concepts (i.e., groups of objects sharing something in common) and operators (i.e.,
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connections and relationships among objects), and knowledge in the domain is simply
captured by equality assertions of the form a = b, where a and b are terms.
In assertional logic, without redefining the semantics, one can extend a current sys-
tem with new syntactic objects by definitions, which are special kinds of knowledge
(i.e., assertions). Once defined, these syntactic objects can be used to define more.
This can be done for assertional logic itself. We extend the primitive form of asser-
tional logic with multi-assertions and nested assertions as well as logic connectives
and quantifiers. We further consider how to extend assertional logic with other im-
portant AI building blocks. The key point is that, when one wants to integrate a new
building block in assertional logic, she only needs to formalize it as syntactic objects
(including individuals, concepts and operators) and defines its interactions with the ba-
sic form of assertions (i.e., a = b). Then, the interactions between this building block
and others will be automatically established since all complicated assertions can es-
sentially be reduced into the basic form. As a case study, we briefly discuss how to
incorporate probability and time points in this paper.
Of course, assertional logic is deeply rooted in first-order logic. Individuals, con-
cepts and operators are analogous to constants, unary predicates and functions respec-
tively, and assertions are originated from equality atoms. Nevertheless, they differ from
many essential aspects. Firstly, individuals can be high-order objects, e.g., concepts
and assertions, so are concepts and operators. Secondly, assertional logic is naturally
many-sorted, that is, the domain of an operator can be a tuple of many different con-
cepts including high-order ones. Thirdly, concepts play a central role in assertional
logic, which is natural for human knowledge representation. While concepts can be
formalized as unary predicates in FOL, they are not specifically emphasized. Fourthly,
in assertional logic, all kinds of knowledge are uniformly formalized in the same form
of equality assertions. As shown in Section 5, complicated logic sentences are defined
as equality assertions as well by embedding connectives and quantifiers as operators
over assertions. Fifthly, following the above, although connectives, quantifiers and
nesting can be defined in assertional logic, they are not considered as primitive con-
structs. In this sense, they will only be used on demand when necessary. We argue that
this is an important reason that makes assertional logic simpler than FOL. Sixthly, in
assertional logic, the simple form of a = b is expressive as a and b can be high-order
constructs and can be inherently related within the rich syntactic structure. In contrast,
equality atoms in FOL do not have this power. Last but not least, assertional logic
directly embraces extensibility within its own framework by syntactic definitions. For
instance, to define quantifiers, assertional logic only needs two lines (see Equations 8
and 9) without redefining a whole new semantics, which is much simpler than FOL.
Assertional logic is also inspired by many approaches in symbolic AI. Tradition-
ally in FOL, there is a strict hierarchy from the term level to the formula level. To
some extent, this is broken in situation calculus [15, 16] and game description lan-
guage [21] that have to quantify over situations, actions and fluents and to directly
talk about whether a fluent holds in a particular situation by a meta-predicate Hold.
Assertional logic goes much further by completely demolishing the distinction and hi-
erarchy between term level, predicate level and formula level. In assertional logic, one
can flexibly use, e.g., atoms and predicates in the scope of a function as long as they
match its domain definition. Also, one can quantify over any well-defined concepts,
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including a concept of assertions. This makes assertional logic even more expressive
than high-order logic that cannot quantifier over formulas.
Another inspiration comes from the family of description logics [2], where the ter-
minologies individuals and concepts are borrowed from. The family of description
logics allows a certain level of extensibility. By interpreting individuals, concepts and
roles as domain elements, unary predicates and binary predicates respectively, one can
extend the basic description logics with more building blocks (e.g., nominal, number
restrictions, inverse and transitive roles etc.) based on the same foundational seman-
tics. Also, one can freely assemble those building blocks into different fragments of
description logics such as ALC, SHIQ, SHION and so on. However, many important
AI building blocks, e.g., actions, probability, time, rules, etc. are still difficult to be
incorporated by this method. Some interesting pioneering work have been done to
consider more extensibility in description logics [3, 5, 9, 14]. Nevertheless, they dif-
fer from assertional logic that embraces extensibility at a syntactic level instead of a
semantic one.
This paper is only concerned with the representation task and the definition task.
We leave the reasoning task to our future work. Certainly, complete reasoning in as-
sertional logic is undecidable as FOL can be embedded in it. Traditionally, the way
to address this issue is to find decidable fragments. Nevertheless, we shall propose an
alternative approach that focuses on efficient but not necessarily complete reasoning.
We have developed such an approach, in which the flexibility and extensibility of asser-
tional logic play a critical role. We shall present this in another paper. Nevertheless, we
argue that representation and definition are worth study on their own merits. Such suc-
cessful stories include entity-relationship diagram, semantic network and many more.
Besides, extending assertional logic with some important AI building blocks, e.g., ac-
tions and their effects, is indeed challenging and worth pursuing.
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